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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper Gerard ’t Hooft proposes to sub-
stitute the “free will postulate in Quantum Mechanics”,
with a condition he calls “unconstrained initial state”.
The paper develops to a great extent a philosophical view
about “free will”:“the ’unconstrained initial state’ condi-
tion has consequences similar to ‘free will’, but does not
clash with determinism [...]. The dismissal of the usual
‘free will’ concept does not have any consequences for our
views and interpretations of human activities in daily life,
and the way our minds function” [1]. The motivation for
reintroducing determinism into physics is threefold:
1) To get a “deterministic quantum mechanics” capa-
ble of describing gravitational forces.
2) To overcome the “unsatisfactory” statistical nature
of the quantum mechanical predictions, since “only theo-
ries that, under ideal circumstances, would predict single
events with certainty should be considered acceptable.”
3) To avoid concern about the transition point between
quantum mechanical possibilities and classical certainties
deriving from the “collapse of the wave function”: “When
and how does such a ‘collapse’ take place?” When and
how does the choice of the measured outcome among var-
ious possible ones happen?
It is ’t Hoofts’s belief that it is time to face such ques-
tions concerning the deeper nature of Quantum Mechan-
ics, and that attempts to answer such questions will lead
to further insights.
Sharing completely ’t Hoofts’s concern about the ne-
cessity of asking “a next generation of questions” that
may allow us to understand Quantum Mechanics at a
deeper level, I discuss in the following his proposal. Sec-
tions II-IV define the meaning of the “free-will assump-
tion in Quantum Mechanics” arguing that the Quantum
World requires causes acting freely from outside space-
time. Section V argues that it is worth to work on de-
veloping deterministic quantizing models of Gravity, as ’t
Hooft suggests. Section VI discusses ’t Hoofts’s “uncon-
strained initial state condition” concluding that it con-
flicts with logic, freedom and experiment. Section VII
shows that it is in principle possible to unify indetermin-
istic Quantum Mechanics and a deterministic description
of Gravity: Unity comes from the assumption of causes
or agents acting into the world from outside space-time,
and diversity from the assumption that these agents may
operate as well in a deterministic or indeterministic way.
Section VIII argues that there is an objective transition
point between the quantum possibilities and the classical
certainties, but one should define it (i.e. when and how
the choice of the observed outcome among various ob-
servable ones happens) with relation to the capabilities
of the human observer. Section IX argues that freedom,
rights and creativity exclude any explanation of the brain
using only observable causal chains, and it is in princi-
ple possible to integrate a quantum mechanical view into
neuroscience. In particular it stresses the relevance of
consciousness and sleep for physics. Finally Section X
summarizes the conclusions.
II. THE ASSUMPTION OF FREE-WILL ON
THE PART OF NATURE IN QUANTUM
MECHANICS
Laplace gave a good characterization of Determinism
by means of his famous “demon”:
“We may regard the present state of the universe as the
effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect
which at a certain moment would know all forces that set
nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which
nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough
to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a
single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of
the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an
intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just
like the past would be present before its eyes.”[2]
By contrast, according to Quantum Mechanics, Nature
makes choices that are not exclusively determined by the
past. This assumption originates from observations that
can be summarized with the experiment sketched in Fig-
ure 1. When one works with sufficiently weak intensity
of light, then only one of the two detectors clicks: ei-
ther D(+) or D(−) (photoelectric effect). Nevertheless,
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FIG. 1: Single particle interference are the entry (sort
of “Platform Nine-and-Three-Quarters”) to the Quantum
World. Laser light of frequency ω emitted by the source is
either transmitted or reflected at each of the beam-splitters
(half-silvered mirrors) BS1 and BS2; therefore the light can
reach the detectors D(+) and D(−) by the paths l and s; the
path-length l can be changed by the experimenter. With suf-
ficiently weak intensity of light, only one of the two detectors
clicks: either D(+) or D(−) (photoelectric effect). Never-
theless, Nature calculates the counting rates of each detector
Pr(+) and Pr(−) taking account of the length of the two paths
l and s (interference effect).
for calculating the counting rates of each detector one
must take into account information about the two paths
leading from the laser source to the detector (interference
effect). Both effects, single clicks and interferences, ap-
pear as well in experiments with particles like electrons
or neutrons.
Experiments, in which in each single run only one of
two detectors clicks, and for a large number of runs the
clicks are statistically distributed between the two de-
tectors according to interference mathematics, are the
entry to the Quantum World, just like Platform Nine-
and-Three-Quarters is the entry to the Wizard World
in Harry Potter. Indeed, according to the Copenhagen
interpretation (mainly proposed by N. Bohr, W. Heisen-
berg, M. Born and P. Jordan) such experiments have
three main implications:
1) Which detector clicks is decided by a choice (on
the part of Nature) when the information about the two
paths reaches the detectors.
2) To this aim, there is an agreement or exchange of
information between D(+) and D(−), no matter how far
away from each other these detectors are.
3) There is an indeterminacy about the time a particle
is emitted from the source, which is inversely propor-
tional to the frequency-band-width of the emitted light
(Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle).
According to 1), which detector clicks in a single run
in the experiment of Figure 1 is not only unpredictable
for us because we don’t yet know the formula connect-
ing the past with the present and the present with the
future, but it is unpredictable in principle because such
a formula doesn’t exist at all. This is the quantum me-
chanical assumption of free-will or choice on the part of
Nature. The concept of “free-will” means here that Na-
ture’s decision about which detector clicks, though it has
some roots in the past, is not completely determined by
the past, i.e. it has not all of its roots in the past. In
particular, the choice on the part of Nature excludes the
“realistic” view that the outcomes are determined by well
defined properties the particles carry when they leave the
source.
According to 2) in Nature there are connections hap-
pening faster than light and without propagation of en-
ergy. This is the quantum mechanical nonlocality as-
sumption, which is implicitly contained in the so-called
collapse of the wave function, and led to the well known
EPR controversy referred to in the next section.
Einstein was highly disappointed about these two fea-
tures of Quantum Mechanics, and expressed his con-
cern with comments like: ”God doesn’t play dice” and
“spooky action at a distance”.
Regarding 3), I would like to stress that Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle should not be considered the base
of Quantum Mechanics but a consequence of the more
basic principles 1) and 2). It builds a guarantee for the
self-consistency of Nature, i.e. for harmonizing the quan-
tum mechanical phenomena with the classical concept of
spacetime: Interferences are possible even if the velocity
of light does not depend on the length of the path, i.e.,
light travels with equal velocity path l and path s in the
experiment of Figure 1.
III. FREE-WILL ON THE PART OF THE
PHYSICIST AND QUANTUM NONLOCALITY
In the experiment of Figure 1 one can escape connec-
tions faster than light if one assumes that the choice
happens at the beam splitter rather than the detectors.
This view was supported by the interpretation Louis
de Broglie proposed at the time of the Solvay Congress
(1927). De Broglie’s interpretation implies that the par-
ticle travels always one of the two possible paths, and an
“empty wave” or “pilot wave” travels the other path. The
“empty wave” is a pure information wave that guides the
particle when both meet at a beam-splitter and makes
interferences possible. The “empty wave” does not carry
any energy and is completely unobservable. De Broglie’s
model may be considered local deterministic, in the sense
that the outcomes are completely determined by informa-
tion within the past light-cone. It may also be considered
“realistic” in the sense that the particles are supposed to
share always a definite position. Nevertheless, the calcu-
lation of the outcomes requires unobservable information
(“empty wave”).
Notice that according to de Broglie’s picture, the par-
ticle always travels a well-defined path. By contrast,
according to Copenhagen the particle actually does not
travel any path: the particle becomes real only at the de-
tection, and the single detections (the “clicks”) are dis-
tributed between the rival detectors according to wave
mathematics, i.e. calculations taking account of all pos-
sible “classical” paths from the source to the detec-
3tors. The assumption that the particle makes a “delayed
choice” between traveling one or two paths is a rather
confused mix of de Broglie and Copenhagen.
The assumption that the choice happens at the beam-
splitter avoiding connections faster than light may have
helped to tranquilize the physicists for a time. But in
1935, Einstein counterattacked and advanced the EPR
argument [3]. The EPR paper basically argued that in
2-particle experiments, as represented in Figure 2, the
quantum mechanical view of an instantaneous “reduc-
tion of the wave packet” leads in anyway to correlations
at a distance. Therefore, if one rejects nonlocal causality
(“no real change can take place in the second system in
consequence of anything that may be done on the first
system” [3]), one must accept that the correlations origi-
nate from “real” properties the particles carry when they
leave the source. The EPR paper stressed very much the
necessity of completing the wave function through addi-
tional observable variables.
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FIG. 2: In 2-particles Bell experiments local randomness and
nonlocal order (correlations) appear inseparably united. The
source emits photon pairs. Photon 1 (frequency ω1) enters
the left interferometer through the beam-splitter BS10 and
gets detected after leaving the beam-splitter BS11, and pho-
ton 2 (frequency ω2) enters the right interferometer through
the beam-splitter BS20 and gets detected after leaving the
beam-splitter BS21. The detectors are denoted D1(̺) and
D2(σ) (̺, σ ∈ {+,−}). Each interferometer consists in a long
arm of length li, and a short one of length si, i ∈ {1, 2}. Fre-
quency bandwidths and path alignments are chosen so that
only the coincidence detections corresponding to the path
pairs: (s1, s2) and (l1, l2) contribute constructively to the
correlations, where (s1, s2) denotes the pair of the two short
arms, and (l1, l2) the pair of the two long arms. Depending
on the value of the phase Φ, the quantity Pr(ρ, ρ) oscillates
between the situation of perfect correlation (Pr(ρ, ρ) = 1),
and that of perfect anticorrelation (Pr(ρ, ρ) = 0). However,
Pr(ρ) for photon 1 alone is always 50%, and Pr(ρ) for photon
2 alone is 50% too. Bell experiments, using two different val-
ues of l1 and two different values of l2, demonstrate that the
correlations violate the locality criteria (Bell’s inequalities).
David Bohm extended in 1952 de Broglie’s idea of the
“pilot wave” to experiments with several particles, and
proposed a picture of Quantum Mechanics which aimed
to give “a precise, rational, and objective description of
individual systems” [4]. The particles always have a well
defined position, in accord with Einstein’s requirement
(Figure 2). However, in the EPR situation, Bohm’s for-
mulation of Quantum Mechanics implies that the out-
come at one beam-splitter precedes in time, and causes
faster than light the outcome at the other beam split-
ter by means of a so-called “quantum potential”. Addi-
tionally, Bohm’s objective description can no longer be
considered completely “realistic” since in experiments in-
volving entangled polarized photon pairs neither of the
two photons carries a definite polarization when it leaves
the source (see [5] and references therein).
On the one hand, Bohm’s picture implicitly contains
the idea that quantum correlations cannot originate
from the particles’ local properties alone. As John Bell
stressed: “This picture [...] has the very surprising fea-
ture: the consequences of events at one place propagate
to other places faster than light. This happens in a way
that we cannot use for signaling. Nevertheless it is a
gross violation of relativistic causality.”([7], p. 171).
On the other hand, Bohm’s theory can be considered
an attempt to cast nonlocality into a time-ordered causal
scheme. Bohm gives up the relativity of time and uses an
undefined preferred frame or universal clock: the value
occurring later (the effect) in this preferred frame de-
pends on the value occurring before (the cause).
John Bell took the next step and showed that: 1) local
properties cannot generate correlations going beyond a
certain degree, and 2) Quantum Mechanics goes beyond
this degree: “Bohm of course was well aware of these
features [consequences propagating faster than light] of
his scheme, and has given them much attention. How-
ever, it must be stressed that, to the present writer’s
[John Bell’s] knowledge, there is no proof that any hid-
den variable account of quantum mechanics must have
this extraordinary character. [Footnote: Since the com-
pletion of this paper such a proof has been found (J.S.
Bell, Physics 1, 195 (1965)]”([7], p. 11).
In more technical terms, John Bell showed that if one
only admits relativistic local causality (causal links with
v ≤ c), correlations occurring in space-like separated re-
gions should fulfill clear locality conditions (“Bell’s in-
equalities”) [6, 7].
Quantum Mechanics predicts correlated outcomes in
space-like separated regions for experiments using 2-
particle entangled states (Figure 2). Suppose one of the
measurements produces the value ρ (ρ ∈ {+,−}), and
the other the value σ (σ ∈ {+,−}). According to Quan-
tum Mechanics the probability Pr(ρ, σ) of getting the
joint outcome (ρ, σ) depends on the choice of the phase
parameters characterizing the paths or channels uniting
the source and the detectors; depending on the value of
the phases, the quantity Pr(ρ, ρ) oscillates between the
situation of perfect correlation (Pr(ρ, ρ) = 1), and that
4of perfect anticorrelation (Pr(ρ, ρ) = 0). However, Pr(ρ)
for photon 1 alone is 50%, and Pr(σ) for photon 2 alone
is 50% too.
According to Einstein’s local view of Relativity one
has to exclude any link faster than light and, therefore,
any direct connection between space-like separated re-
gions. This means that the quantum correlations could
not arise from a direct link between the two measure-
ments, but should originate from some common cause in
the absolute past of both measurements: the correlations
are pre-determined through certain hidden programs the
photons carry when they leave the source. It is as if the
photons would behave like genetical twins, and therefore
the correlations they may produce should obey the Bell’s
inequalities.
However Bell proved that in experiments using mea-
surements with different settings (for instance two differ-
ent values of l1 and two different values of l2 in Figure 2)
the correlations predicted by Quantum Mechanics violate
the Bell’s inequalities (Bell’s theorem) [6, 7].
Bell experiments conducted in the past two decades,
in spite of their loopholes, suggest a violation of local
causality: statistical correlations are found in space-like
separated detections; violation of Bell’s inequalities en-
sure that these correlations are not pre-determined by
some common cause in the past [8]. Nature seems to be-
have nonlocally, and Quantum Mechanics predicts well
the observed distributions.
Nevertheless, even if the quantum nonlocality violates
Einstein’s view that nothing in Nature goes faster than
light, it does not lead to any conflict with Relativity in
the following sense: The quantum mechanical formalism
prevents us from using the unobservable “Bell connec-
tions” for phoning or teleporting faster-than-light [9]. It
could not be otherwise since the Michelson-Morley ex-
periment is an interference experiment, and therefore in
fact a quantum experiment: there cannot be any contra-
diction between the consequences of this experiment and
Quantum Mechanics. If Einstein felt a contradiction, it
was because he extended the validity of Relativity beyond
the limits permitted by the experimental data.
It is important to stress that a crucial assumption in
Bell’s theorem is the free-will of the physicist. This means
for the experiment of Figure 2 that in choosing the values
of the path-lengths l the physicists are not completely
determined by the past. Otherwise one could assume
a sort of conspiracy in Nature guiding the physicist to
set lengths fitting to the properties the particles carry in
order to produce the correlations.
Another important feature of quantum entanglement
is the unity of randomness and order. Bell experiments
show that the quantum distributions do not result au-
tomatically from the real properties the particles carry
and the real settings they meet, but require decisions
taken actually place when measurement happens. Re-
cent experiments with pairs of photons show that the
nonlocal correlations happening in Nature and in Quan-
tum Mechanics require even to give up the assumption
that each single particle carries a definite polarization
when it leaves the source. In other words, it is neces-
sary to accept that the polarization Nature uses for pro-
ducing the nonlocal correlations results from some ar-
bitrary choice done at the moment of measurement [5].
However, in phenomena involving quantum entanglement
there is not only randomness, but randomness and order
together: An event A is nonlocally correlated according
to statistical rules to another event B, and additionally
A is correlated to B, and not to any other events near
B. Behind results which locally look random, there is a
nonlocal order.
IV. BEHIND THE QUANTUM PHENOMENA
THERE ARE FREE AND INTELLIGENT
CAUSES ACTING FROM OUTSIDE
SPACE-TIME
Bohm’s theory actually involves two different assump-
tions: 1) There are influences faster than light. 2) The
event at one of the beam-splitters is the cause of the event
at the other beam-splitter.
As a matter of fact, the conventional Bell experiments
tackled only issue 1). They did not test whether or
not entanglement depends on the timing of the measure-
ments. Actually John Bell himself explained things on
the basis of assumption 2) (and still today one proposes
models invoking this assumption [10]). However, Quan-
tum Mechanics assumes effectively (although implicitly)
that the particles stay nonlocal correlated independent of
any timing. Therefore, also taking nonlocal influences for
granted after Bell experiments, experiments testing the
timing-independence of the quantum probabilities were
surely of interest.
In this respect it is worth to quote Bohr’s answer
(1935) to the EPR paper: “It is true, that we have freely
made use of such words as ’before’ and ’after’ implying
time-relationships [...]. As soon as we attempt a more ac-
curate time description of quantum phenomena, we meet
with well-known new paradoxes, for the elucidation of
which further features of the interaction between the ob-
jects and the measuring instruments must be taken into
account. In fact, in such phenomena we have no longer to
do with experimental arrangements consisting of appara-
tus essentially at rest relative to one another, but with
arrangements containing moving parts, -like shutters be-
fore the slits of the diaphragms,-controlled by mecha-
nisms serving as clocks.” [11]
These words reveal that Bohr somewhat considered the
possibility of experiments with moving devices, and time
measurements by different clocks. A definite proposal for
experiments testing this idea first came in 1997 [13].
In planing such experiments the first problem one must
fix is determining which clocks matter for the time mea-
suring. If one tries to cast nonlocal causality into only
one preferred frame as Bohm does, it is not more rea-
sonable to connect a “cause” event to an “effect” event
5in that frame rather than in some other frame. Effec-
tively a single preferred frame (“quantum ether”) is “ex-
perimentally indistinguishable” [6], and in fact Bohm’s
theory does not contain any clue about how to deter-
mine such a frame. The predictions would remain the
same if one assumes that the preferred frame is a virtual
entity changing from experiment to experiment. One is
tempted to think that Bohm introduces “absolute time”
just because he wishes to justify a causal description, but
in the end, an untraceable “quantum ether” is essentially
the same as deciding arbitrarily which event depends on
which one. For all purposes Bohmian Mechanics can be
considered a causal description but not a temporal one,
in the sense of a time ordering that can be measured by
a real clock, and to date it has not lead to experiments
capable of distinguishing it from Quantum Mechanics.
Since the outcomes are supposed to become deter-
mined at the beam-splitters, and one cannot associate
an inertial frame to the photons, it is natural to assume
that the time at which the decision at one beam-splitter
occurs is measured according to the clock defined by the
inertial frame of this beam-splitter. The fact that all the
reflected photons show a Doppler-shift determined by the
velocity of the device speaks also clearly in favor of this
view: assumed the choice of the outcome occurs at the
beam-splitter, it is the velocity of the beam-splitter which
unambiguously defines the relevant inertial frame for de-
termining the time of the outcome. Accordingly, the de-
cision about the output port by which a photon leaves
a beam-splitter takes account of all the local and non-
local information available within the inertial frame of
this device, at the instant the particle strikes it. Within
each beam-splitters’ frame the causal links always follow
a well defined chronology. This was the basic assump-
tion of the proposal to test whether nonlocal influences
are compatible with time-orderings defined by real clocks
[13, 14].
Notice that as long as one believes (according to Ein-
stein) that there are no space-like influences, the funda-
mental temporal notion could not be other than proper
time along a time-like trajectory. But since Bell experi-
ments did reveal a world consisting in nonlocal connected
events, the “reasonable” position in the very spirit of
relativity is to assume time-ordered causality, and de-
scribe the nonlocal links using lines of simultaneity to
distinguish between “before” and “after”. Indeed, such
a description is very well possible in conventional Bell
experiments, in which all apparatuses are standing still
in a laboratory frame. Since the emission time of the
photons is not exactly the same, and the fibers guiding
the photons from the source to the measuring devices do
not have exactly the same length, according to the clock
defined by the laboratorys inertial frame, one of the mea-
surements always takes place before the other, and the
particle arriving later can be considered to take account
of the outcome of the one arriving before. In experi-
ments with all measuring devices at rest, it is possible to
explain quantum correlations through time-ordered (non-
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FIG. 3: The “before-before” experiment [14, 15]: As beam-
splitters one uses sound waves produced in acousto-optic mod-
ulators (AOM), and propagating at a velocity of 2500 m/s.
Thus, the beam-splitters are in motion in such a way that each
of them, in its own reference frame, is first to select the out-
put of the photons. Then, each outcome becomes independent
of the other, and the nonlocal correlations should disappear.
However experiment shows that the nonlocal correlations ap-
pear independently of the before-before time ordering. This
means that the order of the laws of Nature is not established
by time. Behind the quantum phenomena there are free and
intelligent causes acting from outside spacetime.
local) causality.
However, in experiments with moving apparatuses,
several relevant frames are involved: different clocks
watch the arrival times, and what is “after” according
to the laboratory clock may become “before” according
to one moving clock. Consider an experiment in which
the beam-splitters are in motion in such a way that each
of them, in its own reference frame, is first to select the
output of the photons (before-before timing). Then, each
outcome will become independent of the other, and the
nonlocal correlations should disappear [13, 14].
As said, Quantum Mechanics assumes that the parti-
cles stay nonlocal correlated independently of any tim-
ing, even in such a before-before situation. This means
that before-before experiments are capable of acting as
standard of time-ordered nonlocality (much as Bell’s
experiments act as standard of locality): if timing-
independent Quantum Mechanics prevails, nonlocality
cannot be imbedded in a relativistic chronology; if Quan-
tum Mechanics fails, there is a time ordering behind the
nonlocal correlations, and proper time along a time-like
trajectory is not the only temporal notion.
Acousto-optic modulators have made it possible to per-
form experiments with beam-splitters moving at 2500
m/s and realize the before-before situation [14]. The
setup is represented in Figure 3. The results obtained in
June 2001 uphold the predictions of Quantum Mechanics
[15].
The influences allowing us to phone between two sep-
6arated regions follow time-like trajectories, and can con-
sistently be described in terms of “before” and “after”
by means of real clocks; Einstein’s world contains only
such local causal links. The entanglement bringing about
nonlocal correlations is not sensitive to space and time,
and cannot be described in terms of “before” and “after”
by means of any set of real clocks. The notion of time
makes sense only in Einstein’s world, i.e. along time-like
trajectories.
The results of experiments with moving beam-splitters
mean that the quantum correlations are caused regard-
less of any relativistic chronology: entangled photons run
afoul of the relativity of time, Einstein’s frames have no
effect on “spooky action”, even though we cannot use this
fact to establish an absolute time. So what Quantum
Mechanics actually implies is that in case of space-like
separated measurements the connection the correlations
reveal does not correspond to any real time ordering and,
consequently, is not tied to any experimentally distin-
guishable frame. It is not possible, even in principle, to
distinguish which measurement is the independent and
which the dependent one. In this sense, the experiment
rejects models invoking a particular frame of reference
and stating that measurement on particle 1 happens first
in time, and that its result immediately affects the state
of particle 2 [10]. The “before-before” experiment def-
initely rules out the view that one of the events at the
beam-splitters is the cause of the other one.
Suppose an intellect could act non-locally and would
like to bring about Bell-correlations. this intellect would
first choose one event assigning randomly a value (either
+ or −) to it, and subsequently would assign a value
depending upon the first, to the second specific event.
Suppose these operations occur without the flow of time;
as Quantum Mechanics seems to mean, and the experi-
mental results confirm, this is the way things happen in
Nature [16].
It is also worth to stress that according to Quantum
Mechanics the statistical distribution corresponding to a
determined phase Φ, say 80 % counts in detector D(+)
and 20% in detector D(−) in the experiment of Figure
1, appears even if after every single detection one would
replace the two detectors through two new ones. This
means that the information of what has already been
counted remains stored in some memory without need of
any material carrier.
In conclusion, the experiments testing quantum entan-
glement rule out the belief that physical causality neces-
sarily relies on observable signals, and that an observable
event (the effect) always originates from another observ-
able event (the cause) occurring before in time. This
means that the quantum correlations have roots outside
the space-time and, in this sense, originate from a free
and intelligent agent. One is led to accept “ the two free-
doms”: the freedom of the experimenter and the freedom
of Nature [12], and to see quantum randomness as a par-
ticular expression of free will. Actually I think that the
experiments with moving devices described above are a
stronger proof of the free-will theorem than that pro-
posed in [17]: If I assume to be someone rather than
nothing, if I assume to share intellect and free will, if I
claim in particular that the author of this article is not
exclusively the Big-Bang, I have also to accept that there
is some intellect behind the quantum phenomena rather
than assuming that there is nothing.
All these results support the view that the quantum
distributions originate from an enormous amount of cal-
culations and decisions unobservable intellects (Nature)
do taking account of the experimental setup. “Wave
functions” exist and evolve in such mighty minds, which
do not require a brain to know and act. By contrast-
analogy to the classical demons (Laplace’s and Maxwell’s
ones) I would like to propose naming the non-neuronal
intellects performing the quantum mechanical distribu-
tions as quantum angels.
V. INDETERMINISTIC QUANTUM
MECHANICS MAY BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR
EXPLAINING GRAVITY ...
Gerard ’t Hooft forewarns very definitely that indeter-
ministic Quantum mechanics “fails when gravitational
forces come into play”, and “superstring theory does not
appear to give us hints as to where such solutions will
come” [1]. It is this failure that leads him to the belief
that explaining gravity requires deterministic Quantum
Mechanics.
On the one hand, such a warning does not come from
lack of knowledge about how efficient indeterministic
Quantum Mechanics can work: ’t Hooft has substantially
contributed to establish the Standard Model, which “de-
scribes in meticulous detail how all known constituents
of matter behave. It is an entirely quantum mechanical
description, and one can say that Quantum Mechanics
has emerged as an absolutely indispensable framework
for this description.” On the other hand, the warning
does not reflect lack of effort or expertise in the field
of Quantum Gravity: ’t Hooft himself is working since
about 20 years to the unification of Quantum Mechanics
and Gravity, and has achieved results like his holographic
principle, which is a major contribution to the field. In
view of ’t Hooft’s CV, one should take his warning seri-
ously.
One understands that the success of gauges theories
and the Standard Model invites very much to quantize
gravitational fields as one quantizes electromagnetic ones.
However, the experiments founding Quantum Mechanics,
like that of Figure 1 and 2, rely on the possibility of defin-
ing at least two different optical paths leading from the
same source to the same detector. And such a possibility
relies on the fact that light can be screened, and guided.
An indeterministic quantum theory of gravity must
also basically assume that gravitational waves can go
from one same source to one same detector by two dif-
ferent “paths”. The impossibility of screening and guid-
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to conceive these “paths” as different geometries rather
than worldlines. In any case, a quantum mechanical the-
ory of gravity means that it is possible to produce inter-
ferences with gravitational waves coming from one sin-
gle source. Therefore, any model trying to apply inde-
terministic Quantum Mechanics to gravitational forces
should include a proposal for such interference experi-
ments. Without this it is surely worth continuing to work
on developing deterministic quantizing models of Grav-
ity. But, even taken for granted that explaining gravity
requires a deterministic quantizing procedure, this is not
a sufficient condition to assume that one can explain the
quantum phenomena, and in particular quantum entan-
glement, using exclusively a deterministic procedure.
VI. ... BUT ’T HOOFT’S “UNCONSTRAINED
INITIAL STATE CONDITION” CLASHES WITH
LOGIC, FREEDOM, AND EXPERIMENT
Gerard ’t Hooft defines its “unconstrained initial state
condition” as “the possibility to freely choose our initial
states”: If we would have been deprived of the possibility
to freely choose our initial states, we would not know
whether our model makes sense at all: “we must demand
that our model gives credible scenarios for a universe for
any choice of the initial conditions!.” [1]
Gerard ’t Hooft quotes the following statement of the
mathematician Conway: “We have to believe in free will
to do anything; I believe I am free to drink this cup of
coffee, or throw it across the room. I believe I am free in
choosing to have this conversation.” [18]. And then he
comments: “But of course Conway should know that, in
spite of his apparent freedom to throw his coffee across
the room or not, whatever he actually does is determined
by laws of physics, not by some mysterious, unspecified,
free will. This, at least, is the real implication of the
assumption of determinism. He is free to choose what to
do, but this does not mean that his decision would have
no roots in the past.” [1]
Nevertheless, ’t Hooft says, the universe, because its
complexity, for all practical purposes remains for us as
unpredictable as it is in the quantum mechanical descrip-
tion: “even the best conceivable computer, cannot com-
pute ahead of time what Mr. Conway will do, simply
because Nature does her own calculations much faster
than any man-made construction, made out of parts ex-
isting in Nature, can ever do. There is no need to demand
for more free will than that.”[1]
Gerard ’t Hooft rejects the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion because it “carries a certain amount of agnosticism”:
“We will never be able to determine what actually hap-
pened during a physical experiment, and it is asserted
that a deterministic theory is impossible. It is this ag-
nosticism that we disagree with.” [24]. Implementing the
quantum mechanical view in string theory “one discovers
that we cannot rigorously define what quantum mechan-
ical amplitudes are, what it means when it is claimed
that ‘the universe will collapse with such-and-such prob-
ability’, what and where the observers are, what they are
made of”[24].
The very basis of ’t Hoofts’s model seems to be his
conception of causality as exclusively temporal causal-
ity: “The notion of time has to be introduced if only
to distinguish cause from effect : cause must always pre-
cede effect. [...] Since laws of Nature tend to generate
extremely complex behavior, their effects will surely de-
pend on the order at which they are applied, and our
notion of time will establish that order.”
A. Logical oddities
Assuming, as ’t Hooft states, that there is “only one
kind of logic”, I dare to say that his “unconstrained initial
state condition” bears some logical oddities:
If the notion of time establishes the order of the laws of
Nature and is the essential ingredient for defining causal-
ity, one wonders how there can be an “initial state” at
all. If one assumes an initial state in time, then one ac-
cepts that the cause of this initial state is outside time,
and therefore time cannot be the essential ingredient of
causality.
It seem also to us that Mr. Conway is well aware that
he would not be creating his coffee, at the moment he
would “throw his coffee across the room”, and therefore
Conway is not claiming at all that “his decision has no
roots in the past”. Accordingly, regarding Mr. Conway,
it may likely be more fair to say that, in postulating free-
will, what he claims is rather that his decision has not
all roots in the past, i.e. is not completely determined
by the past. Certainly, “whatever he actually does is
determined by laws of physics”, but for the time being
it sounds a bit assuming to pretend that the “quantum
mechanical laws” do not deserve the status of laws of
physics. And if whatever Mr. Conway actually does,
follows quantum mechanical laws, then he is perfectly
coherent and rational in claiming that he is free, in doing
what he does.
If I understand well ’t Hooft’s definition, he seems to
assume that free choice in the sense of Quantum Me-
chanics does actually exist but only as the possibility the
scientist has for choosing the initial conditions in order
to develop a mathematical proof, so for instance to see
whether some initial conditions would lead to a contra-
diction. In this sense he seems to assume that thinking
requires freedom (a view Kant already shared, and I fully
share too). Nevertheless, choosing some initial conditions
in a proof means nothing other that setting certain neu-
ral assemblies in your brain, to the aim of studying how
these assemblies evolve. But this is exactly the same as
an experimenter does to the aim of changing the settings
in the setup of Figure 2. If we accept that the choice of
the initial conditions in a proof has not all roots in the
past, then one should also assume that the choice of the
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Additionally, even admitted that today models should
be able to describe credible scenarios for any choice of the
initial conditions, one may doubt that some physicist was
present at the Big-Bang performing the very choice that
actually and deterministically led to the present state
of the world affairs. Let us assume it was God, as an
uncaused cause, who performed this choice. But then
one wonders why God’s choice was so weird to produce
two classes of scientists contradicting each other: those
believing in free will, and those denying it. It seems more
logical assuming that in the beginning God created also
the quantum randomness, and thereby make it possible
the two classes of scientists to arise.
In summary, ’t Hooft’s view seems in the end to reduce
to a conspirational theory in which the initial conditions
of the universe are so contrived that the scientist cannot
help to set the experimental parameters according to the
properties the EPR pairs carry so that the correlations
arise. For sure, in a deterministic theory, this conspira-
tion is difficult to object against. So finally, the whole
question seems to to be: “Either you are for freedom, or
not”. And finally this is also a matter of free choice ...
B. Incompatible with freedom
The deterministic view bears problems also regarding
freedom as the basis of law and social life:
Disposing of the usual free will concept, and stating
that there is no need for more free will than that leading
to the practical impossibility for a human being to predict
the future, may have severe consequences “for our views
and interpretations of human activities in daily life, and
the way our minds function”: If my deeds are determined
by the initial conditions at the beginning of the universe,
I can assume to act under command of these conditions
and do not feel responsible at all for the harm I could
do to others. But the conscience of such a responsibility,
and not only the fear of possible penalties, is presumably
essential for the functioning of any free society.
As Conway states, free will is a capability we daily use.
If free will is an illusion, societies relying on this capabil-
ity should go wrong. Interestingly, History shows rather
the opposite: disposing of the principle that humans are
free to choose what to do, brings up dreadful societies.
In fact, inside the deterministic logic the following grave
implication seems inescapable: when someone purport-
ing determinism comes to political power, and has to
take decisions concerning human activities in daily life,
he will tend to identify himself with a determining “su-
perior might” choosing the conditions for the evolving
of society, and consider the others as beings without free
will, who have no need to demand for more freedom than
that of “the uncertainty about their future”. The others,
if they think also deterministically, will agree in perform-
ing the decisions of the “superior might” without feeling
any responsibility for their deeds.
It is somewhat astonishing that great determinist
thinkers like Spinoza and Laplace overlooked such obvi-
ous consequences. Kant was aware of them and wanted
to keep the causality of freedom while declaring that it
was incompatible with the causality of nature. Somewhat
Kant proposed the contradiction as philosophical way of
life. The reasonable attitude, I dare to say, had been
to state: If thinking requires freedom, physics cannot be
deterministic and some day it will be completed through
some indeterministic description. This is what happened
when Quantum Mechanics arrived, and in particular the
Copenhagen interpretation.
Therefore, it seems to me that this interpretation does
not carry any agnosticism at all. As said, I think that
a deterministic theory of gravity is possible, but not a
deterministic theory of everything. Asserting that a de-
terministic theory (of everything) is impossible, Copen-
hagen renders freedom possible [19]. Indeed the failure to
predict the single event Copenhagen assumes, is a merit
rather than a defect. Consider the brain of professor ’t
Hooft. I think it is impossible to make a theory capa-
ble of predicting which will be the precise title of the
next e-Print this brain will produce for arXiv.org, and
this not only for reasons of complexity, but since the ti-
tle involves free decisions this brain has not yet made,
i.e., decisions whose roots are not all in the past. Would
all of ’t Hooft’s decisions be completely determined by
the Big-Bang, then he would have no merit for his dis-
coveries, and it is the Big-Bang, and not the professor,
who should have been rewarded with the Nobel Prize. If
there is someone behind the single events in the profes-
sor’s brain, then quantum indeterminacy is a necessary
ingredient for the way human brains function. Hopefully,
since otherwise a day will come in which neuroscientists
will be capable of putting us under the Imperius curse!
C. In conflict with experiment
Even more than from these logical and anthropological
oddities, the main problem with ’t Hooft’s proposal for
a deterministic quantum theory of everything may come
from the incompatibility of his causality view with the
experiments referred to above:
Indeed, for the time being, it is not clear how one can
from variables at the Planck scale, by means of mere local
causality, reproduce quantum distributions that are not
only nonlocal but absolute timing independent. In our
view, as Classical Physics up to now, any future sharp
local description of reality will have to define its variables
with relation to classical properties we can change like we
wish [20]. One is then necessarily led to the Bell’s locality
criteria.
More important: As ’t Hooft acknowledges, his deter-
ministic model does not yet explain “(destructive) inter-
ference”. But this means that the model has not yet
entered the quantum realm. If you pretend to have a
quantum mechanical description of the world you have
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If one wishes to develop an alternative theory to indeter-
ministic Quantum Mechanics one should care from the
very beginning that the theory is capable of explaining
quantum mechanical interferences.
Finally, it may be wise to keep in mind that ’t Hooft’s
is not the first attempting to turn back the wheel of his-
tory. Einstein tried to demolish quantum indeterminism,
and Quantum Mechanics is still alive. More specifically,
Bohm tried to develop a “deterministic Quantum The-
ory”, and he was led to nonlocality! And taken non-
locality for granted, I myself tried to keep to temporal
causality and demolish at least the quantum mechani-
cal timing-independence. But timing-independence pre-
vailed. Anyway ’t Hooft’s view of causality, in which
the notion of time establishes the order, seems to conflict
from the very beginning with the “before-before” experi-
ment, which shows that Nature establishes order without
time.
VII. IS IT POSSIBLE TO UNIFY
INDETERMINISTIC AND DETERMINISTIC
QUANTIZING PROCEDURES?
The preceding discussion rises the question about
whether it is possible to combine an indeterministic
Quantum Mechanics capable of describing two paths in-
terferences with a deterministic quantizing procedure de-
scribing Gravity.
At this point, it is useful remembering that the crucial
reason for quantizing General Relativity is that it bears
black hole singularities. At a singularity the determin-
istic laws of physics no longer apply. Nevertheless, all
known singularities appearing as solutions of Einstein’s
equations are always screened by “an event horizon”,
which prevent us from observing the singularity. Thus,
whatever an outside observer sees is determined by usual
laws of physics and whatever happens beyond the horizon
is totally irrelevant for the phenomenology of a black hole
[22]. Determinism still works for all observational pur-
poses. But one is led to accept the existence of domains
of physical reality in which one cannot even predict how
space-time behaves by means of deterministic equations.
This is exactly the opposite of what General Relativity
is supposed to be able to do. By predicting black holes,
the theory somewhat predicts its own collapse.
As first step to overcome this oddity, I propose to keep
to Bohr, and acknowledge “the necessity of a final re-
nunciation of the classical idea of causality and a radical
revision of our attitude towards the problem of physi-
cal reality” [11]. In fact this means to generalize the
insights of the “before-before” experiment, and give up
definitely the idea that each observable event can be ex-
plained exclusively by observable causes in the past, also
when describing the classical deterministic world.
As already noted above, in his deterministic model ’t
Hooft himself actually assumes causality coming from
outside the space-time. For if one assumes an initial state
in time, then one necessarily accepts that the cause of this
initial state is outside time.
A possible way to get rid of temporal observable causal-
ity when describing the classical world it may consist in
conceiving it as an animation performed by the same
non-neuronal intellects who are behind the quantum phe-
nomena. In this view the movements of trains or planets
would really very much happen as they do in the pretty
animations by professor ’t Hooft in his homepage [21].
Entities ’t Hooft calls “changeables” or “ghost operators”
would correspond to nothing other than the operations
performed by such invisible intellects.
Again, ’t Hooft himself seems to suggest the anima-
tion picture when he states: “Nature does her own cal-
culations much faster than any man-made construction,
made out of parts existing in Nature, can ever do” [1].
If “Nature calculates”, then there are minds calculating,
and the calculation has to stop at a certain point. So for
instance the orbit of the planet Mercury or the bubble
trail of an electron in a bubble chamber result through
a sort of plotting and erasing information pixels at some
extremely tiny scala. Information disappears at a time
and appears again the next unit of time.
According to this view the whole visible body is at once
the source and the detector, it consists in units of infor-
mation appearing and disappearing very quickly, just like
the desktop picture on a computer screen. Between two
units of time there is no space-time and no matter, but
only something like a wave function in the mind of the
invisible, non-neuronal intellects performing the anima-
tion.
The non-neuronal intellects responsible for the classical
animation are the same as those calculating the quantum
mechanical distributions. In quantum phenomena they
combine both indeterministic and deterministic proce-
dures: on the one hand, for each single event they decide
the outcome at will, and calculate the distribution of the
single events taking account of the information about the
different paths between the source and the detectors ac-
cording to the quantum mechanical rules; on the other
hand they calculate the evolution in time of the quantum
statistical distributions according to deterministic proce-
dures like Schro¨dinger’s equation. In case of the classical
phenomena they calculate all the way using determin-
istic procedures: the information content of a pixel P is
completely determined by the content of the pixels in the
past light-cone of P, according to deterministic equations
of movement. Nature calculates time evolving quantum
distributions and visible bodies according to similar de-
terministic equations.
In the animation picture the concept of information
becomes fundamental for classical deterministic physics
too. The information contained in a pixel P of the space-
time is completely determined by the information con-
tained in the pixels building the past light cone of P.
But it does not make sense to say the pixels in the past
light-cone of P are the cause of P, because between pixels
10
there is no “bridge”, no reality (no information) at all.
Information pixels are conditions, not causes, even if the
appearances may lead to the illusion that they are causes,
as Conway’s Game of Life illustrates pretty well [23]. In
this sense Hume’s critics of temporal causality speaks in
favor of the animation picture too. The “reversibility of
the physical laws” is a mathematical illusion: behind any
physical phenomenon there is a decision.
The view I am proposing, very much like the Copen-
hagen interpretation, implies that a physical description
makes sense as far as its theorems are linked to avail-
able or possible observations. Therefore it does not make
sense to ask what happens within a region from which
in principle no information can reach a human observer.
I call death horizon the boundary around a black-hole
beyond which the functioning of any human brain will
irreversibly break down and the human observer can be
declared clinic death. According to the size of the black-
hole, the death horizon can be larger, equal or smaller
than the event horizon (in case of a very large hole, a
human observer could cross the event horizon, and write
a master work before dying). I call end of the world
the smaller of the two horizons, death or event horizon:
who travels into a black hole will arrive at a world’s end.
Because no information from beyond a world’s end can
reach any human observer, beyond this end any calcula-
tion of Nature necessarily stops.
This means that a black hole singularity has no physi-
cal reality. This also means means that any information
falling into the hole must remain stored at a world’s end,
much the same way as information about detections re-
mains stored in some immaterial memory and not in the
detectors (see the end of Section IV ). In this sense it is
natural to assume that, if a black-hole evaporates, the
resulting radiation should be capable of informing ob-
servers in the outside region about what falls into the
hole and about new information eventually created be-
tween the event and the death horizon.
Regarding quantum computers Gerard ’t Hooft dares
to predict: “In our view, it [decoherence] will be one
of the essential obstacles that will forever stand in the
way of constructing super powerful quantum computers,
and unless mathematicians find deterministic algorithms
that are much faster than the existing ones, factorization
of numbers with millions of digits will not be possible
ever.” [24] Fully acknowledging the formidable challenge
of decoherence, it seems to me that this time it is ’t
Hooft who exhibits a remarkable amount of agnosticism
and a not very enlightened view. As far as decoherence
does not lead to irreversibility (see Section VIII), I am
confident that super powerful quantum computers will be
possible, as electron and scanning tunneling microscopes
are possible. I am confident also about the possibility
of super accurate and powerful information technologies
exploiting the deterministic procedures Nature uses for
“plotting” and “erasing” pixels at the smallest scala.
If the calculations responsible for the classical phenom-
ena are performed by the same intellects performing the
quantum mechanical distributions, ’t Hooft’s program for
deterministic methods quantizing gravity does not disen-
chant at all the Quantum Realm but rather suggest that
one has to enchant the Classical one.
VIII. THE TRANSITION POINT BETWEEN
“QUANTUM MECHANICAL POSSIBILITIES
AND CLASSICAL CERTAINTIES”
I discuss now motivation 3) in ’t Hooft’s proposal: to
overcome the problem of the transition point from quan-
tum to classical, the point “at which observations turn
into classical certainties”. The problem was brought into
focus already by Bohr in his answer to the EPR paper:
“While, however, in classical physics the distinction be-
tween object and measuring agencies does not entail any
difference in the character of the description of the phe-
nomena concerned, its fundamental importance in quan-
tum theory, as we have seen, has its root in the indispens-
able use of classical concepts in the interpretation of all
proper measurements, even though the classical theories
do not suffice in accounting for the new types of regu-
larities with which we are concerned in atomic physics.”
[11].
As far as one accepts that there are both, a quantum
indeterministic and a classical deterministic realm, the
question naturally arises: where do we draw the line be-
tween the two realms, or in Wheeler’s wording, when
does a process of amplification become irreversible and
produce a registered phenomenon? [25].
If our animation view is correct, once an information
is registered, for instance the first bubble of the bub-
ble trail of an electron in a liquid hydrogen chamber,
successive plots will deterministically follow in natural
units of time, in the corresponding observer’s frame. But
when precisely does the wavefunction collapse and the
first bubble appear? The same question can be put with
relation to the detection of a photon by a photomulti-
plier: When exactly after the wave’s arrival can we say
the detection takes place?
In this context “gravitationally induced decoherence”
[26] and “spontaneous wave function collapse” [27] have
been invoked. These processes are also denoted “objec-
tive reduction”(OR) or “unconventional decoherence pro-
cesses” [26] because they dispose of the assumption that
a human observer has to be actually present for a reg-
istration to take place. But it may also be profitable to
consider a daily process that is generally considered to be
irreversible in principle: I mean death, already referred
to above with relation to the black holes. The clinical
definition of death includes explicitly the concept of irre-
versibility as it basically states that death occurs when
the neural functions responsible for certain spontaneous
movements irreversibly breakdown. In establishing death
this way, we are assuming as obvious that our capacity of
restoring neuronal dynamics (our repairing capability) is
limited in principle, even if we don’t yet know where this
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limitation comes from. In an analogous way one could
assume that a process of amplification in a photomulti-
plier becomes irreversible in principle at a certain level,
if as soon as this level is reached an operation beyond
the human capabilities would be required to restore the
photon’s quantum state. When such a level is reached
the detector clicks. Such a view combines the subjective
and the objective interpretation of measurement: on the
one hand no human observer has to be actually present
in order a registration takes place, just the same as in the
GRW “spontaneous collapse” [27]) or Penrose’s “objec-
tive reduction” (OR) [26]; on the other hand one defines
the ’collapse’ or ’reduction’ with relation to the capabil-
ities of the human observer.
Though getting a sharp formulation of “measure-
ment” may depend of understanding what “irreversibil-
ity” means in the definition of death, “measurement”
means creation of information too. According to An-
ton Zeilinger a detection is an individual act of creation.
When the ensemble of quantum mechanical possibilities
(the wavefunction) breaks down, one of the various possi-
ble outcomes becomes reality. When detection happens,
new information is put into the world. Therefore it seems
plausible to assume that the size of the neuronal assem-
blies required for generating consciousness (see Section
IX below) establishes the minimal amount of energy the
“click” requires.
The view proposed here (very much like Bohr’s view in
his answer to EPR) implies that there cannot be such a
thing as a “wave function of the whole universe”, which
would also include all human observers. If there is no hu-
man observer outside the wavefunction, there is no wave-
function at all. The fundamental importance of the hu-
man observer in Quantum Mechanics is the obvious con-
sequence of the fundamental importance of observation
and evidence in science: No science without observation,
and no observation without observer. What Quantum
Information seems to tell us after all is that the world
is a dialogue between mighty non-neuronal intellects and
human ones. Only someone mad keeps speaking if there
is nobody to hear at him. And Nature is not mad.
These arguments suggest that the assumption of a
transition point between quantum and classical is not
absurd, though “the measurement problem”, i.e. where
must we precisely draw the line between the two realms,
remains a mystery still to elucidate in today’s physics.
IX. TOWARDS A PHYSICS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS AND SLEEP
Anyone who accepts freedom must necessarily reject
any explanation of the brain using only deterministic
causality, be it in terms of genes, chemicals or environ-
mental influences: anyone believing that as a person he
can escape genetic programming and “chose how to live
his life” should coherently exclude any explanation of the
brain including only observable causal chains. Anyone
who is for freedom and claims for his rights, necessarily
assumes that his free will is somehow involved in gov-
erning certain movements of his human body. When I
speak or write, I implicitly assume that I am governing
the movements of my lips, hands and eyes through the
spiritual powers of the soul, i.e. my free will and intellect.
The way we behave in daily life, the way we organize so-
ciety through law, even the successful implementation of
quantum mechanical methods in financial markets pro-
vide evidence supporting an explanation that combines
both, deterministic and quantum causality.
Many features of my brain’s physiology are susceptible
of deterministic description in terms of observable causal
chains (the metabolism involved in the arousal poten-
tials triggering bodily movements, for instance, follows
the usual physical conservation laws). By contrast, the
choices guiding my spontaneous movements, for instance
typing a particular key (’r’, ’a’, ’d’, ’o’, etc.) while writ-
ing this paper, they originate from unobservable spiritual
agency, i.e. my self or soul [28]: I am obviously their au-
thor and responsible for them, as Mr. Conway would
be responsible for throwing his coffee across the room,
and would eventually be ordered to clean the floor. This
quantum philosophical view overcomes the dualistic view
of the soul “as something mental, divorced from the tan-
gible grey matter”.
But at what level in the brain does the choice deter-
mining whether someone moves his right or left hand take
place? We know today that this depends on the build-
ing of different transient neuronal assemblies. But which
processes may be responsible for the difference? The neu-
ronal assemblies (like the counts in different detectors in
quantum experiments) are measurable. But the cause
choosing between two rival neuronal assemblies, as the
cause choosing between two rival detectors, may very well
be unobservable. Our prediction is that the realization
of one specific neuronal assembly among several possible
ones cannot be explained exclusively through determin-
istic causality but depends on quantum effects.
For the time being, a big difficulty in tackling this is-
sue by experimental means originates from the high in-
accuracy of current measuring techniques: imaging tech-
niques for instance are still too slow to capture the re-
cruitment of ten million cells in less than a quarter of a
second. Nonetheless understanding how alternative be-
havioral patterns (moving this way, instead of another
way) originate in the brain is in our opinion crucial for
neuroscience, and even inaccurate exploratory experi-
ments may be beneficial to progress.
Besides mathematical undecidability (Go¨del and Tur-
ing theorems) and the impossibility of signaling faster
than light, there is a third fundamental limitation defin-
ing the human condition: the impossibility of uninter-
rupted consciousness. The human mind cannot be con-
tinuously conscious (i.e. aware of his own existence), the
human will cannot act on purpose all the time. If con-
sciousness requires a certain size of neural assemblies in
our cortex [29], such assemblies undoubtedly represent
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an important achievement of evolution. But I dare to
state that evolution never will be able to produce a brain
capable of achieving consciousness without having to pay
for it with sleep.
A human person can be considered a unity of con-
sciousness and sleep, a neuronal intellect. Our brain is
a device combining both, meaningless spontaneous be-
havior and purposefully ordered one. An image, crude
though it may be, can help to suggest a way how this
could happen. Imagine a brain operates to a certain ex-
tent like a quantum interferometer (Figure 1). A single
outcome, either ’+’ or ’−’, represent a bit of information,
and a large series or string of outcomes (a bit string) build
a piece of information. The physiological measurable pa-
rameters of the interferometer are fixed by a number of
factors (genetic, epigenetic and environmental ones), and
in particular by sensorial impressions. These parameters
determine the statistical distribution of the outcomes for
large series at a given time, say for instance: 53% ’+’ and
47% ’−’. During certain periods of time the interferom-
eter produces meaningful pieces of information (speech,
text, musical composition, painting...), where the mean-
ing is given by the order of the bits in the string. During
other periods of time (while sleeping and even during
many wake periods) the interferometer produces mean-
ingless strings of bits. Hence, I fully support the view
that “the causal efficacy of mental effort is no illusion”,
but I think one can have this without invoking the Quan-
tum Zeno Effect [19]. It seems more plausible to assume
that the efficacy of consciousness originates from influ-
encing the order of the bits in the string of outcomes
without violating their statistical distribution for large
series.
According to the Synaptic Homeostasis Hypothesis,
“sleep is the price we have to pay for plasticity, and its
goal is the homeostatic regulation of the total synaptic
weight impinging on neurons” [30]. As a complementary
hypothesis, I propose Quantum Homeostasis : the home-
ostatic regulation of the quantum statistical distribution
of brain outcomes. In producing wilful and meaningful
pieces of information (short series of bits), the statistical
distribution of the brain outcomes may differ to some ex-
tent from the distribution the physiological parameters
impose for large series of outcomes. Such a statistical
deviation needs to be balanced by other periods (sleep,
uncontrolled movements) restoring the large scale distri-
bution. (Such a restoration, and in this sense Quantum
Homeostasis, is already at work in any quantum random
number generator). In particular I claim that REM sleep
is important not only to the developing of the infants
brain, but also to the homeostatic regulation of quan-
tum distributions in each phase of life: REM sleep is the
price we have to pay for rather short periods of inten-
tional and meaningful behavior. In this perspective the
unity of consciousness and sleep requires a world gov-
erned by quantum physics. Anyway, a physical theory
speaking about free will and consciousness should also
speak about sleep.
According to the proposed quantum model, on the one
hand, emotion (“the most basic form consciousness” [29])
does not necessarily imply “the reduction of a quantum
state”: in this sense one can have consciousness without
reduction. On the other hand, a choice between several
possible neuronal assemblies can very well be described
as the jump of a wavefunction into one of its eigenstates.
However, the jump may correspond to a conscious choice
or an unconscious one. In this sense I assume that human
consciousness is not strictly necessary for the collapse
of the wave function [31]. But obviously I also assume
that there are conscious collapses and free choices. Over-
whelming evidence supporting this assumption, I dare to
repeat, comes from the way scientists themselves behave:
any publishing scientist would claim to be the conscious
and free author of the work he publishes, and not a zom-
bie experiencing hallucinations. Conscious life is more
than a dream, even if dreams are important for conscious
life.
Finally, the discovery that quantum phenomena in-
volve order beyond time may be relevant for explaining
the outcomes of brains: How do neural and cognitive
processes correlate to timeless mathematical theorems?
How is it possible that mortal brains produce so many
immortal achievements in literature, science, music etc.?
In summary, even if Quantum Mechanics is currently
not being used in neuroscience, one may be confident that
quantum effects will appear when the measuring tech-
niques progress.
X. CONCLUSIONS
If I accept that I am free I have to accept that be-
hind the quantum phenomena there are mighty intel-
lects reading the experimental parameters, calculating
the statistical distributions of the events, and deciding
the outcomes. Within quantum physics there is place for
spiritual agents getting information from the observable
world and putting information into it, i.e. guiding the
world through the choices they do.
It is possible to unite a deterministic explanation of
Gravity with indeterministic Quantum Mechanics, if one
accepts that the classical phenomena are also calculated
by the same intellects though in a deterministic way.
From this point of view, ’t Hooft’s proposal does not
look as “an important step towards the demystification
of quantum mechanics” but seems rather to inspire the
incantation of Classical Mechanics.
The irreversibility of death suggests to use the limit
of the human repairing capability for establishing when
the “reduction of the wave function” takes place. How-
ever “reduction” can be considered an objective process
in the sense that no human observer has to be actually
present in order a registration happens. There must be
dependence between the measurable physical parameters
defining when a detection takes place, and the neuronal
assembly size required for consciousness to happen.
13
Nature calculates the phenomena with the aim of in-
forming human observers. On the one hand, extend-
ing this quantum mechanical principle to the theories
of Gravity may help to overcome oddities. On the other
hand the principle makes clear that the concept of “the
wave function of the entire cosmos” does not make sense.
In order to describe a world where freedom and cre-
ativity are possible it is crucial to develop a neuroscience
that overcomes determinism. Quantum Mechanics will
surely be of help to this aim.
The “Quantum Information” vision that “information
is the stuff the world is made of”, seems to mean after all
that the physical reality is made of words non-neuronal
intellects speak to neuronal ones.
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